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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

NARRATIVE RELEVANCE, IMAGINED JURIES, AND A SUPREME
COURT INSPIRED AGENDA FOR JURY RESEARCH

RICHARD O. LEMPERT*
This paper has its roots in Old Chief v. United States,1 a case the Supreme
Court of the United States decided in 1997. I will begin by describing this
case; then comment on its implications for the Supreme Court’s conception of
the jury, and conclude by examining the agenda one may draw from it for
empirical jury research. Old Chief arose when Johnny Lynn Old Chief was
charged not only with assault with a dangerous weapon and using a firearm in
the commission of a crime of violence, but also with violating a law that
forbids convicted felons from possessing firearms.2 To prove the “felon in
possession” charge, the government sought to introduce a record of Old
Chief’s prior felony conviction which disclosed that he had been sentenced to
five years imprisonment for an unlawful assault that had resulted in serious
bodily injury.3 Old Chief’s defense was that he never possessed a gun, and he
offered to stipulate to the fact that he was a convicted felon and so would have
violated the felon in possession law if the jury found he had possessed a gun.
It is clear that under the American law of evidence, evidence of Old
Chief’s prior conviction would have been inadmissible had he been charged
only on the first two counts and not as a “felon in possession.” The prosecutor
rejected the stipulation, arguing that he had a right to prove this case with
whatever relevant evidence he wished.4 The trial judge agreed with the
prosecutor, and the appellate court affirmed.5 The Supreme Court, in a 5–4
decision written by Justice Souter, reversed.6 The Court held that, despite the
broad discretion that Federal Rule 4037 gives trial judges in deciding whether
to exclude evidence because its probative value is substantially outweighed by
* Eric Stein Distinguished University Professor of Law and Sociology, The University of
Michigan. I would like to thank Craig Callen for the very careful reading he gave this paper and
for his many useful suggestions for improvement as well as for the help several of his students
gave me in tracking down citations.
1. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
2. Id. at 174.
3. Id. at 177.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 178.
7. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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its prejudicial effect, the trial judge could not reasonably have admitted this
evidence given the availability of the stipulation.8 The Court was correct. The
proffered stipulation would have given the jury all the information it would
have been authorized to draw from evidence of the conviction—specifically
that Old Chief had been convicted of a felony and would be guilty under the
statute if he possessed the gun. The other information that the prosecutor got
before the jury by presenting the conviction, the nature of the prior offense,
could only have prejudiced the jury by leading it to believe that Old Chief was
a violent person.
While Old Chief marked the first time the Supreme Court limited a trial
court’s discretion under Federal Rule 403,9 the Court attempted to limit the
reach of the case, so that parties could not use stipulations to exclude all
evidence that carried with it substantial prejudicial potential.10 In so doing, the
Supreme Court recognized a sense in which evidence can be relevant which
does not fit within the Federal Rule’s core definition of relevant evidence as
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”11 Specifically, the Court recognizes as
relevant evidence which relates to a case and which helps a party tell an
involving and coherent story. Justice Souter wrote:
The “fair and legitimate weight” of conventional evidence showing individual
thoughts and acts amounting to a crime reflects the fact that making a case
with testimony and tangible things not only satisfies the formal definition of an
offense, but tells a colorful story with descriptive richness . . . . Evidence . . .
has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come
together a narrative gains momentum, with power not only to support
conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences,
whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict. This persuasive
power of the concrete and particular is often essential to the capacity of jurors
to satisfy the obligations that the law places on them . . . . [T]he evidentiary
account of what a defendant has thought and done can accomplish what no set
of abstract statements ever could, not just to prove a fact but to establish its
human significance, and so to implicate the law’s moral underpinnings and a
juror’s obligation to sit in judgment. Thus, the prosecution may fairly seek to
place its evidence before the jurors, as much to tell a story of guiltiness as to
support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors that a guilty verdict would
be morally reasonable as much as to point to the discrete elements of a
defendant’s legal fault.

8.
9.
10.
11.

519 U.S. at 191-92.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
519 U.S. at 192.
FED. R. EVID. 401.
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But there is something even more to the prosecution’s interest in resisting
efforts to replace the evidence of its choice with admissions and stipulations,
for . . . there lies the need for evidence in all its particularity to satisfy the
jurors’ expectations about what proper proof should be. Some such demands
they bring with them to the courthouse, assuming, for example, that a charge of
using a firearm to commit an offense will be proven by introducing a gun in
evidence. A prosecutor who fails to produce one, or some good reason for his
failure, has something to be concerned about . . . . Expectations may also arise
in jurors’ minds simply from the experience of a trial itself. The use of
witnesses to describe a train of events naturally related can raise the prospect
of learning about every ingredient of that natural sequence the same way. If
suddenly the prosecution presents some occurrence in the series differently, as
by announcing a stipulation or admission, the effect may be like saying, “never
mind what’s behind the door,” and jurors may well wonder what they are being
kept from knowing. A party seemingly responsible for cloaking something has
reason for apprehension, and the prosecution with its burden of proof may
prudently demur at a defense request to interrupt the flow of evidence telling
the story in the usual way.
In sum, the accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case free
from any defendant’s option to stipulate the evidence away rests on good
sense. A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may
be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it . . . . A
convincing tale can be told with economy, but when economy becomes a break
in the natural sequence of narrative evidence, an assurance that the missing
link is really there is never more than second best.12

I refer to the aspect of relevance Justice Souter describes as narrative
relevance. The justification for admitting such evidence, despite the
possibility that it might inappropriately sway jurors as it engages their
emotions, is that the evidence is needed to place more factually probative (or
less prejudicial) evidence in the context of a convincing narrative about what
happened.
The first thing to note about the portion of Old Chief I have quoted is the
image of the jury implicit in Justice Souter’s recognition of narrative
relevance. The jury is not, as the Court assumed in the jury size cases, a
mechanical processor of information whose output, and all that matters, is the
verdict. Nor is the jury easily biased or confused, contrary to what one might
assume from the great discretion recent Supreme Court cases have given trial
judges to exclude scientific evidence.13 Instead the jury is an active, curious,
and intelligent processor of information. The jury is motivated not just by its

12. 519 U.S. at 187-89.
13. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire, Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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duty to decide a case correctly but also by its interest in learning what
happened. The jury recognizes, deals in, and may be persuaded by, nuance.
Jurors actively create their own stories from the facts provided, and if some
important item of evidence seems missing or is under-emphasized, they may
hold this failure against the party responsible for it. The jury is, not
unreasonably, suspicious when evidence is provided in strange or unfamiliar
ways, as by stipulations. Further, jurors not only wonder about information
they feel is being withheld, but they may also actively construct explanations
for gaps in the evidence. The jury does not merely process facts but also
considers what is morally reasonable. Above all, the jury evaluates stories not
as specific strings of evidence but as gestalts that hang together coherently or
fail to do so. Consequently, parties have the right in most cases—albeit not in
Old Chief itself—to present facts in the context of stories with considerable
texture. They may introduce material which supplies that texture even when it
does not fit the Federal Rule’s definition of relevant evidence and has
substantial potential for prejudice.
To illustrate what I think Old Chief allows, I believe it is not unfair to read
the case to say not only that prosecutors ordinarily have a right to show jurors
bloody pictures of crime scenes, but also that jurors may expect such pictures
and are likely to see the prosecution’s case as weaker if the prosecution only
provides them with verbal descriptions of the crime scene. The prosecution
suffers not because it is unable to arouse the jury emotionally by showing gore
but because cognitively the jury suspects that the prosecution did not want
them to know the full story. Moreover, the case suggests that there is nothing
intrinsically wrong with the jurors appreciating the full brutality of the crime
and that society may benefit if the bloody pictures better enable the jury to
assess the morality of the crime they are judging. Yet, the holding in Old Chief
indicates that jurors ordinarily should not rely on their assessment of a
defendant’s character to support a conviction without regard to what they know
of the crime.
So Old Chief takes us away from an image of the jury, implicit in some
past cases, as a group of relatively fragile lay decision-makers who may not,
for example, properly discount hearsay evidence14 and are likely to be
bamboozled by glib witnesses peddling junk science.15 It offers instead the
image of a robust decision maker that is actively participating in the
construction of an account of what occurred. Old Chief does not deplore the
14. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 132-33 (1968).
15. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (holding
the trial court should be more willing to use Rule 403 to exclude expert testimony, in light of
degree to which it may be misleading, than to exclude lay witness testimony) (quoting Jack B.
Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138
F.R.D. 631, 632 (1992)).
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effect of jurors’ emotional and moral perspectives on their efforts to get at the
truth, a dramatic change from how the influence of emotion on legal fact
finding is commonly regarded. Instead, it sees emotional involvement and
moral judgments as integral to the decisions we expect jurors to make. Jurors
in Old Chief become fully human.
From the perspective of social psychologists studying the jury, there’s also
much to take from Old Chief. First, the Court not only recognizes the story
model of case presentation associated with Lance Bennett and Martha
Feldman,16 and the story model of jury decision making, which Nancy
Pennington and Reid Hastie17 introduced about a decade ago, but treats them as
if they were established truths about what lawyers should do and how juries
decide cases. These supposed truths are, of course, empirical propositions.
While it seems clear that lawyers strive to include evidence in their cases that
is only narratively relevant (if it is relevant at all), it is less clear how
narratively relevant evidence affects the jury’s construction of stories. Hastie
and Pennington showed that the order in which evidence was presented affects
the degree to which juries are persuaded by it.18 Evidence presented in story
order is more persuasive than the same evidence presented in witness order.19
But we know little about whether a more richly textured and presumably more
interesting story is more persuasive with juries than a story which has the
essential facts needed for a judgment, but is not richly supplied with
connecting narrative facts.20
Second, the idea of narrative relevance complicates some of the normative
assumptions students of the jury often make when investigating the quality of
jury performance. For example, suppose one wished to study whether juries
are biased by attention-getting or emotionally-arousing evidence. A simple
paradigm for such a study is to show one group of mock jurors bloody pictures
of a decapitated corpse while the second group is only told that the victim’s
head had been cut off. If the first group were more prone to convict than the
second, the natural conclusion would be that the pictures aroused the first
group’s emotions and improperly influenced their judgment of the weight of
the evidence. After Old Chief, it is not as easy to make this normative

16. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981).
17. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The
Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991).
18. Id. at 541-44.
19. Id. at 542.
20. Studies of testimony, however, indicate that irrelevant detail makes a witness’s relevant
testimony appear more credible that it would appear without the detail. See Brad Bell &
Elizabeth Loftus, Trivial Persuasion in the Courtroom: The Power of (a Few) Minor Details, 56
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 669 (1989).
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conclusion. In light of Justice Souter’s analysis, it seems possible that the jury
that saw the pictures was more interested in the case as a whole, or better
appreciated the coherence of the prosecution’s story, and, therefore, reached
the better decision. Our empirical research has left us with a further empirical
question; one that requires us to look at process rather than at outcome in
assessing how well juries have performed. Moreover, even when one has
access to process, it may not be easy to determine the effects of narratively
relevant evidence on the quality of jury decisions. If, for example, jurors in the
bloody picture condition argue more passionately for conviction, or conversely
easily reach a decision to convict without substantial argument, have they done
a better job than jurors in the witness condition who fail to convict because the
only passionate juror argues for acquittal or because they differ so much
among themselves that they cannot reach a decision? It could be that the latter
jurors have performed worse because they do not care as much about “getting
it right.”
A third area to which Justice Souter calls our attention concerns the
implications of gaps in stories.21 Again, Judge Souter’s analysis raises a
wealth of empirical questions, and we know little about most of them. What,
for example, constitutes a significant story gap? Is Justice Souter right in his
suggestion that a jury will see a gap or feel cheated when an essential fact that
could be proved in a dramatic and potentially prejudicial fashion is instead
proved by stipulation? Will the quality of jury deliberations differ depending
on whether facts are proved by evidence or established by stipulation, and if
so, how? It is not at all clear that the quality of jury deliberations will be
affected by the jurors’ sense that there is a gap in what has been provided
them. Jurors may understand that proof in courts of law has special
characteristics which caution against making inferences from how evidence is
presented, and they may be able to rely on the evidence that they have heard,
rather than drawing inferences from what they have not heard, so long as the
evidence presented adequately supports a verdict.
Justice Souter suggests that jurors have rather strong expectations
regarding what evidence should be presented to prove certain issues, generated
either by their personal experiences or by what the case they are hearing tells
them about trial procedure. He illustrates what he means with examples of
jurors expecting that a gun will be introduced when a person is charged with
firearm violence, and expecting that witnesses will be used to prove all the
facts in a case because the first facts presented were proven in that manner. It
would be interesting to identify the expectations of proof jurors bring with
them to the courtroom or acquire in the course of a trial, and their reactions
when their expectations are disappointed. There are, for example, anecdotes of
21. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 189.
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jurors being influenced by what they have seen in actual or fictional televised
trials.22 Some lawyers implicitly support Souter’s theory as they seek to play
on jurors’ expectations to raise doubts if an opponent has not presented
evidence stereotypically associated with her case. Thus defense counsel in
criminal cases often defend, in part, by emphasizing gaps in the state’s story,
such as the absence of fingerprint evidence in a burglary prosecution or the
state’s failure to produce the gun used in an assault.23 It is not clear, however,
whether defenses that essentially call the jury’s attention to possible gaps in the
other side’s presentation often succeed. Generalizing from the transcripts and
trial descriptions I have read, it often appears that when a defense in a real trial
consists largely of pointing to gaps in an opponent’s story, it is because other
evidence tending to make a case for the defendant is weak. In a close case,
however, gaps in expected stories may make a difference. Again we have a
topic for empirical investigation. Although the literature includes reports of
mock jury deliberations in which gaps in evidence have been brought up, the
matter has not been systematically studied.
There is, however, another side to the gap issue which calls into question
the admission of narratively relevant evidence that Old Chief celebrates.
Cognitive psychologists have shown that subjects who have been given a large
portion of a schema or story and asked to recall what they were told, tend to fill
in gaps in information in a manner that fits whatever the story led them to
expect. When quizzed, they will remember hearing story-consistent facts they
were never told.24 It is possible that an engrossing, narratively rich trial story
22. Reid Hastie, for example, told me of a mock juror in one of his simulation studies who,
“had been in a community theatre production of ‘Twelve Angry Men’ and who spouted speeches
from the Henry Fonda role in our mock-jury deliberations and said, when we asked, that he had
done it in real juries, too.” [Personal communication from Professor Reid Hastie (Sept. 3, 1999)].
In DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 481 (1991), the author adds:
More than anything else, it’s the cathode-ray tube—not the prosecutor, not the defense
attorney, certainly not the evidence—that gives a Baltimore juror his mindset . . . . Never
mind that the trace lab rarely makes a case, a juror nonetheless wants to see hairs and
fibers and shoe prints and every other shard of science gleaned from Hawaii Five-O
reruns.
23. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188.
24. See F.C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1932); G.H. Bower et al., Scripts in Memory for Text, 11 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
177 (1979); J.D. Bransford et al., Sentence Memory: A Constructive Versus Interpretive
Approach, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 193 (1972); A.C. Graesser et al., Constructing Inferences
During Narrative Text Comprehension, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 371 (1994); Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment, 14
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 521 (1988). Some
psychologists, however, suggest that little gap filling occurs. For a general review, see E. Tory
Higgins & John A. Bargh, Social Cognition and Social Perception, 38 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 369
(1987).
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may foster similar tendencies. Jurors who hear a large portion of a familiar
story, but not its entirety, may recall story-consistent information that was not
presented to them, or they may assume that such information exists.25 In
addition, narratively rich information may produce an unduly strong tendency
in jurors to credit story-consistent testimony or information even though it
clashes with what, without the context of the story, would be more persuasive
evidence. In Old Chief, for example, if the jurors heard that Old Chief’s felony
was a crime of violence, they might, on that account, have credited the
testimony of an eyewitness who claimed to have seen Old Chief with a gun in
his hand rather than what they otherwise might have found to be the more
credible testimony: that of two eyewitnesses who swore Old Chief had no
gun.26 So the best reason to exclude the evidence of the specific prior felony
committed by Old Chief may not have been the possibility of prejudice in the
sense of creating a pro–conviction bias, but, instead, because of the cognitive
implications of this narratively rich evidence for a jury, that in good faith, is
evaluating the probative value of the evidence that implicates or exonerates
Old Chief. Here, too, is an area that cries out for empirical investigation.
In his discussion of narratively relevant evidence, Justice Souter assumes
that such evidence would benefit the offeror’s case more than a stipulation
would, and parties rejecting stipulations certainly make that assumption. But is
the assumption always correct? Might not an uncontested stipulation that
carries with it the judge’s imprimatur sometimes have greater weight than
seemingly more vivid testimony which is questioned vigorously on crossexamination? We do not know. Nor do we know whether narratively relevant
evidence’s persuasive power stems from the virtues that Justice Souter recites,
such as its attention-stimulating features and its elimination of gaps that
confuse juries or leave them speculating about the implications of missing
evidence and the motives of the party whom they think withheld it. Evidence
that would be inadmissible but for its narrative relevance may persuade juries
for less palatable reasons: it may conduce to unwarranted gap filling or affect
juries by exciting passions or prejudice. Before Old Chief, it was generally
assumed that parties who refused to accept stipulations to important facts did
so because they sought to present less legally binding but more vivid proof of
these facts; that is, proof that would influence juries for reasons other than the
logical weight the evidence deserves. After Old Chief, except in rare situations
like that in the principal case, seeking to persuade by more than logic has the
Supreme Court’s imprimatur. Will this promote justice? Is it what we want?

25. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 17, at 519.
26. See D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and
“Legitimate Moral Force”: Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 403, 447 (1998).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

NARRATIVE RELEVANCE, IMAGINED JURIES AND A SUPREME COURT

23

Another virtue of narrative relevance for Justice Souter is that colorful
stories with descriptive richness can sustain the willingness of jurors to draw
whatever inferences are necessary to reach an honest verdict.27 It is not clear
why jurors would be unwilling to draw the inferences essential to reach honest
verdicts with less colorful evidence or how narratively relevant evidence has
the effect that Justice Souter posits. Two possibilities come to mind. The first
is cognitive; mental work is required to draw inferences from facts. Jurors
exposed to richly descriptive evidence may be more motivated to do this work
than jurors who have heard a more bare bones story, or they may have less
work to do because the additional facts trigger scripts stored in their memories.
But the converse is also possible. It may take more cognitive work to focus on
the facts needed to make necessary inferences when they are embedded in a
captivating story or if they trigger a legally inappropriate script than when they
are presented in starker fashion. The second explanation is motivational.
Evidence that involves a juror as a whole person may be needed to counteract
jurors’ emotions in situations where they would otherwise be reluctant to draw
valid inferences, such as the inference that a person who assists at a mercy
killing has an intent to kill. For example, Dr. Kevorkian’s conviction after four
jury acquittals may have happened because the prosecution had a movie of the
doctor actually killing a “patient” rather than just a description of what
occurred. But the verdict may also have been due to the trial court’s decision
to bar Dr. Kevorkian from presenting evidence that was narratively relevant
from his perspective: namely, evidence from the deceased’s close family
members about the deceased’s condition and desires and their sense that what
Dr. Kevorkian did was a blessing that brought peace to a loved one. Finally,
Dr. Kevorkian’s more active role in bringing about death in the killing for
which he was convicted might have been critical—he had previously “merely”
constructed lethal machines that a person wanting to die could trigger. Perhaps
even a colorless description of how Dr. Kevorkian had acted to bring about the
death he was tried for would also have resulted in a conviction. In Justice
Souter’s speculations there are rich possibilities for empirical investigation.
Unless and until the possibilities he posits are affirmed empirically, they
should be treated as speculations. The Supreme Court issues binding
statements of law, but no matter how authoritative these statements are in
determining the law and no matter how much the logic of the legal ruling
depends on the Justices’ views of facts, facts do not exist because the Justices
believe them.
The law of evidence and the behavior of juries have been persistent themes
in the teaching and research that I have done throughout my career. Old Chief
brings them together in ways I find fascinating. As an evidence case, it
27. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187.
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recognizes limits to the judge’s discretion under FRE 403 when evidence,
despite its prejudicial potential, is unlikely to raise strong emotions, as well as
the existence of rare cases where exclusion is mandated. It also departs from
the literal readings of the Federal Rules that dominate most of the Supreme
Court’s recent rulings interpreting these rules. Instead, the Court recognizes a
new aspect of relevance that relates more to the actual persuasiveness of
evidence than to its abstract tendency to make a fact in issue more or less likely
than it would be without the evidence. As a case on the role of the jury, Old
Chief presents a different image of the jury from the view that commonly
seems to motivate Supreme Court decisions. It calls into question what
seemed before Old Chief to be well-established norms regarding the
appropriate influence of different kinds of evidence on jurors. Finally, the Old
Chief Court places its imprimatur on the story model of jury decision-making,
and in doing so suggests new questions for empirical research on juries and
gives a new urgency to further research on old questions. Few cases in recent
memory have raised more intriguing questions about how juries respond to
evidence.

